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In his undergraduate philosophy dissertation Wallace described fatalism as ‘a meta-
physical thesis characterizing the world as working in a certain sort of way, in which 
everything that did happen had to happen, everything that does and will happen must 
happen, and in which persons as agents can do nothing but go with the flow over which 
they enjoy absolutely no influence’ (2011: 143). From the same editorial team that 
brought this thesis to the masses comes Freedom and the Self: Essays on the  Philosophy 
of David Foster Wallace, a collection emphasising Wallace’s ‘overlooked’ philosophical 
background that continues to ‘play a lasting role in his work and thought, including 
his ideas about the purpose and possibilities of fiction’ (Ryerson, 2011: 2).
Considering Wallace’s early engagement with technical modal logic  alongside 
his later eudaemonic meditations, the collection cements its foundation on 
 philosophical terms to bolster an appreciation of Wallace’s fiction that points to 
future potentials for more nuanced readings of his works.1 The first four essays each 
elucidate significant attributes of Wallace’s response to Taylor’s “Fatalism”. William 
Hasker’s opening piece, ‘David Foster Wallace and the Fallacies of “Fatalism”’ (1–30), 
illustrates the ‘splendid achievement’ of Wallace’s System J (the logico-semantic 
framework created to articulate the flaw in Taylor’s argument for fatalism) as a 
contribution to contemporary Taylor criticism. Nevertheless, Hasker highlights an 
error in Wallace’s argument, though one that does little to diminish his  achievement. 
Conceding that this achievement is merely, thanks to System J, a more effective 
update of John Turk Saunders’s initial criticism, Hasker believes that Wallace ‘has 
failed to grant Taylor’s premise P5 in the sense in which Taylor understood it’ (22). 
Specifically Wallace refuses to grant Taylor’s rhetorical tenacity in upholding our 
understanding of ‘consequences of’ as ‘conditions for’ (Wallace, 2011: 169). This 
impairs Wallace’s argument because, Hasker argues, Wallace’s ‘admirably explicit’ 
outline of his philosophical project was ‘to grant [Taylor] everything he seems to 
want in the argument’ (18; Wallace, 2011: 151). Hasker finds this flaw in Wallace’s 
 1 Based on Taylor, S. J., 2015. “getting to the core of things”: A Review of Robert K. Bolger & Scott 
Korb, eds. Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace and Philosophy and Steven M. Cahn & 
Maureen Eckert, eds. Freedom and the Self: Essays on the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace. 
Postmodern Culture, 26(1).
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uncharacteristically careless reading of Taylor’s Metaphysics ‘in which the view [of 
the distinction between the act and the ability to act] is attributed by Taylor to his 
opponents’ (27; Taylor, 1974: 64–66). If correct, Hasker illustrates that Wallace’s was 
indeed a formidable mind capable of achieving intellectual success even in spite 
of, through an exceptional misreading, failing to maintain the integrity of his 
 argumentative methodology.
In ‘Wallace, Free Choice, and Fatalism’ (31–56) Gila Sher highlights the  subtle 
distinctions between logical and semantic arguments: though the former is 
 commonly (and erroneously) attributed to Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’, Wallace was aware 
that the latter better described Taylor’s method. This is crucial, because it is only by 
 considering Taylor’s modal operators (as he himself does) as nonlogical that Wallace 
is able to advance the description of them as physical by ‘distinguish[ing] between 
two types of physical modalities’ (40). This distinction underpins Wallace’s proof that 
Taylor’s conclusion is an ambiguous and therefore insufficient defence of fatalism. 
Sher concludes that Wallace’s sensitivity to Taylor’s ambiguity allowed him a bifur-
cated rendering of the conclusion of ‘Fatalism’: either the ‘context of evaluation’ or 
‘the context of occurrence’ is dominant; in the latter case, Free Choice is still an active 
force that denies fatalistic constrictions (43–44). Concluding that attention to detail 
and innovative technical distinctions at the semantic level allow Wallace to reclaim 
Free Choice from the clutches of Fatalism results from a comprehensive apprecia-
tion of his semantic sensitivity, Sher illustrates the efficacy of engaging with denser 
works in furthering our understanding of Wallace’s relationship with language and 
philosophy.
M. Oreste Fiocco is similarly appreciative of Wallace’s semantic distinctions. 
Where Sher focussed on the treatment of personal agency in both Taylor and Wallace, 
Fiocco is concerned with what kind of philosophical structure permits such agency. 
For Fiocco, this is contingency, ‘the presence of nonactualized possibility in the 
world’ (57). In ‘Fatalism and the Metaphysics of Contingency’ (57–92) Fiocco considers 
Wallace’s critique of Taylor’s argument ‘significant’ because it foregrounds ‘synchronic 
possibility, the idea that incompatible states of affairs are possible at a single 
moment’. Synchronic possibility, Fiocco believes, ‘provides the basis of distinguishing 
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two systematic accounts of truth’, namely ‘modality and time: two metaphysics of 
contingency’ (58). In the first – modality – contingency is located at each moment, 
thus permitting synchronic possibility; in the second – time – contingency is the 
result of moments succeeding toward a future, where ‘possibility arises not at this 
moment but from it’, thereby denying synchronic possibility (79). From these defini-
tions, Fiocco illustrates that, while Wallace foregrounds this notion of synchronic 
possibility, ‘Wallace and Taylor are actually making incompatible assumptions about 
the nature of contingency; each is presupposing a totally different view of the modal 
features of the world in time’ (76). Fiocco criticises Wallace’s assumption that Taylor 
accepts synchronic possibility, arguing that Taylor instead subscribes to a temporal 
(not modal) metaphysics. This should prove greatly interesting to Wallace scholars: 
synchronic possibility evidently plays a significant role in Wallace’s own understand-
ing of contingency. Fiocco writes that the ‘importance of synchronic possibility 
to Wallace’s thinking [. . .] is apparent from the “visual apparatus” he presents to 
illuminate his discussion’ (81; Wallace, 2011: 184–186). Here Fiocco cites Wallace’s 
inclusion of a graphical timeline in his thesis, which charts the convergence and 
divergence of incompatible realities at single moments of contingency, where free 
will determines which realities would then be actualized (Wallace, 2011: 186). 
‘[A]lthough the focus is on the relations among worlds at moments’. Fiocco writes, 
‘an essential feature of these moments is that there are many possibilities at any 
given one’ (81).
Editor Maureen Eckert then considers Wallace’s philosophical work alongside 
its narrative consequences. In ‘Fatalism, Time Travel, and System J’ (93–108), Eckert 
considers Wallace’s ‘System J [. . .] useful for exploring [David] Lewis’s account [in 
‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’ (1976)] of the shift of context driving the Grandfather 
Paradox while pushing further into matters of modality’ (100). Eckert also explains 
System J, supplementary to Hasker’s earlier illustration.2 In Wallace’s ‘semantic 
 2 Readers of Fate, Time, and Language will note that this definition is an expansion of her brief sketch 
of the strategy provided in her introduction to Wallace’s thesis (Eckert, 2011, 135–9).
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machinery’, Eckert writes, ‘[s]ituations are joined in “mother-and-daughter” relations 
that compose causal paths’. Eckert notes that ‘[t]his model permits a fine-grained 
tracking of situational physical modalities and, ultimately, their relationships over 
time, preventing the crucial scope errors that the fatalist argument trades upon’ 
(102). Using Wallace’s model, Eckert shows how we are justified in presently  judging 
the obvious impossibility of a certain event which occurred yesterday (e.g. that Big 
Ben was destroyed by a North Korean missile) but we are ‘not entitled to conclude 
that yesterday’ the order for such an event could not be given (103). A corollary is, 
Eckert notes, ‘the most radical feature of System J’: the model ‘allows for no 
 alternative presents in the context of an actual given present’ (103). This feature of 
System J permits, in Eckert’s own Lewisian example, ‘no way [for] a time traveller [to] 
actually and physically return to a past moment in personal time’ whilst defending 
the impossibility’s conceivability (105). With liberated imagination and contingent 
reality thus demarcated, Eckert concludes with thoughts of Wallace’s evolution from 
philosopher to author. Is it problematic, Eckert wonders, for an author-to-be ‘to sever 
fictional realms from the actual physical world so cleanly and decisively’? (106) The 
semantic system Wallace constructed, System J, appears to do exactly this, yet Eckert 
finds the system’s elegance equally appealing to both philosophers and authors 
(106). Wallace’s formal system, like his fiction, is thus an elegant means to locate true 
freedom of choice, to demystify by debunking rhetorical sleights, such as Taylor’s, 
that defend a fatalistic universe or one with a Lewisian, violable past. Eckert, then, at 
last widens the discussion of the legacy of Wallace’s early work on Taylor’s “Fatalism” 
to the narrative concerns of his fiction, as he exchanged philosophical semantics for 
semantically sensitive narratives.
Observing the shift from philosophy to creative writing, Eckert lays the 
 foundation for Daniel R. Kelly’s ‘David Foster Wallace as American Hedgehog’ 
(109–132). Kelly declares that ‘much of what Wallace talks about under the monikers 
of free will and choice’ must be understood in their ethical, existential, and everyday 
senses (128n2). Kelly takes this colloquial (i.e. non-Logical) understanding of free will 
to be the ‘one big thing’ Wallace ‘knows’. By contextualizing Wallace’s understanding 
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of free will by referring to his major primary works – essays on Dostoevsky, Kafka, 
television and contemporary American fiction, in addition to Infinite Jest – Kelly is 
able to persuasively conclude that ‘[t]he reason [Wallace’s] Kenyon address feels like 
a skeleton key to his entire body of work is that it makes [one] point [. . .] directly’ – 
namely that ‘Wallace’s most fundamental piece of advice’ for regaining free will 
from a noisy, faith-lacking, hedonistic American culture ‘can be distilled down to two 
simple words: wake up’ (124).
Encouraging further study into a corollary of considering free will as ‘Wallace’s 
hedgehog’s “big subject”’ – the ‘secondary shadow’ of ‘fraudulence’ as explicated in 
his later work, specifically ‘Good Old Neon’ (2004, 179) – Kelly seemingly anticipates 
the collection’s final essay. In ‘David Foster Wallace on The Good Life’ (133–168), 
Nathan Ballantyne and Justin Tosi aim to ‘contrast what Wallace says with some 
popular positions from moral philosophy and contemporary culture’, on what phi-
losophers call the good life (133), namely ‘ironism’, ‘hedonism’, and ‘narrative theo-
ries’, thereby locating Wallace’s implied eudaemonic theory. Such triangulation leads 
Ballantyne and Tosi to conclude that ‘Wallace suggests [both] an attractive method 
for pursuing moral questions [n]ot unlike Wittgenstein’ and ‘also offers clear propos-
als about the content of a good life’ (135). While they acknowledge that it is beyond 
their means to fully articulate his method and content of a good life, Ballanytne 
and Tosi believe that their ‘reading of Wallace will begin to sketch answers’ (135) to 
questions about the details of his artistic ethics – a call for further interdisciplinary 
engagement between Wallace Studies and Philosophy. Perhaps the essay’s biggest 
problem, however, concerns the attempt to identify and define Wallace’s stance on 
‘narrative theories’ of life. While convincingly illustrating how Wallace rejects the 
‘weak’ formulation of story-based ontologies, Ballantyne and Tosi are less success-
ful explaining his opinion of the ‘strong thesis’: ‘The strong thesis features a subtle 
and  complicated understanding of the self’, they write, and ‘[w]e’re not ultimately 
sure how Wallace would engage with the view’ (157). This is a curious conclusion 
as Wallace’s early works, namely The Broom of the System and ‘The Empty Plenum’, 
clearly stem from a deep interest in the strong narrative theories of Wittgenstein 
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and Derrida. What makes the essayists’ omission more glaring is their subsequent 
comment that Wallace’s ‘humane recommendations about how to approach reflec-
tion on the good life’ is ‘a sort of Wittgensteinian methodology’ – the ambiguous 
description tantamount to an obfuscation of Wallace’s ultimate consideration of 
Korsgaardian narrative theories (159). Nevertheless, this final essay does provide an 
early engagement with Kelly’s proposal that ‘fraudulence’ is antithetical to Wallace’s 
free will: Ballantyne and Tosi’s identification of fraudulence in narrative theories of 
the good life indicates a promising site for future scholarship.
A tightly structured, well-informed and, at times, highly fertile collection, 
Freedom and the Self is a rigorous philosophical addition to Wallace Studies. 
Answering Fate, Time, and Language ’s call for Wallace’s philosophical arguments 
to ‘be taken seriously and subjected to careful scrutiny’, Freedom and the Self is a 
sincere ‘tribute to a philosopher of consequence’ (Cahn & Eckert 2011: viii). Readers 
of Freedom and the Self may be frustrated that this ostensible ‘assessment [. . .] of 
Wallace’s philosophical thought’ (Cahn and Eckert, 2011: vii) restricts itself, for the 
most part, to Wallace’s only explicitly philosophical offering – his undergraduate 
thesis. Yet the collection illustrates the significant benefits of serious engagement 
with Wallace’s dissertation, which allows the development of his fundamental 
creative inspiration – ‘what it is to be a fucking human being’ (McCaffery, 1993: 
131) – to be seen from its genesis.
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